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of Certified Public Accountants and before the Univer-
sity of Dayton Tax Institute, Dayton — December 1960 
R E C E N T C O U R T D E C I S I O N S 
BACKGROUND 
Shortly after the enactment of the 1954 Code, considerable pub-
licity was given in tax publications, newspapers, and elsewhere to an 
alleged loophole in the then new depreciation allowances. A n example 
was given of a man earning $100,000 a year who pays $4,600 for a car 
for use in his business. It was then demonstrated that after using this 
car for a year and selling it for $1,200 less than he paid for it, the man 
made a net-after-tax cash profit of $525. Using the double-declining 
balance method of depreciation he takes a deduction of $2,300 (based 
on a four-year useful life). This reduced his taxes $2,000 since he was 
in the 87% bracket. He paid $275 capital gains tax on the sale of the 
car (25% of $1,100). Thus, the net reduction in his tax was $1,725. 
After subtracting the $1,200 cash loss on the sale of the car he had 
$575 more cash in his pocket than he had before he bought the car. 
This idea was quite appealing to the many taxpayers who owned 
property subject to depreciation allowances, particularly those who 
usually sold their property before it reached the end of its physical life. 
There were others, however, who didn't appreciate this state of affairs. 
I assume they were the people who didn't use their automobiles in 
their work. In any event, one congressman was so distressed about 
the situation that he wrote to the Treasury Department. Mr . Laurens 
Williams, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, replied to the 
congressman and the congressman placed the reply in the Con-
gressional Record of June 16, 1955. 
This recitation of an incident occurring in 1955 undoubtedly seems 
out of place in a 1960 discussion of current developments. However, 
Mr. Williams' letter contained the first official statements by the 
Treasury Department as to the meaning it would attribute to the con-
cepts of "salvage value" and "useful life." His letter represents the 
commencement of a controversy which lasted five years and just 
terminated in June 1960. 
254 
Mr. Williams asserted that the statements publicizing this tax 
scheme were based on several wholly fallacious assumptions: 
First, he said they ignore salvage value. Moreover, he said, a 
realistic salvage value must be used. Consideration must be 
given to the taxpayer's use of the property, the retirement and 
maintenance practice he follows, and the salvage or other 
proceeds he realizes on disposition of the property. Where a 
taxpayer's practice is to dispose of depreciable property sub-
stantially before the end of its full physical life, the realistic 
salvage value will be the amount which probably will be realized 
at the time of disposition. Thus, in the example given, deprecia-
tion would be allowable only on the difference between the car's 
cost ($4,600) and its salvage value ($3,400). 
Secondly, he stated the allowable rate of depreciation is dependent 
on the useful life of the property. "Useful life" for this purpose 
is not the full physical life normally inherent in the property. 
Rather it is the useful life of the property determined in ac-
cordance with the practice of the particular taxpayer in his 
trade or business. Thus, in the example given, since the tax-
payer used the property for but one year, his depreciation rate is 
100%—the full difference between the cost and salvage value. 
Third, since the accelerated depreciation methods allowable under 
the 1954 Code apply only "in the case of property with a useful 
life of three years or more," the taxpayer in the example given 
could not use the declining-balance method. 
This obviously was not a casual letter dashed off hurriedly by a 
representative of the Treasury Department to placate an irate con-
gressman. It seems more likely that a considerable amount of time 
was spent by some very talented people in studying this entire prob-
lem. It would be interesting to know whether the Treasury Depart-
ment had already formulated its ideas on this subject prior to the 
widespread publicity of this alleged loophole. In any event, the same 
ideas expressed in Mr. Williams' letter were substantially incorporated 
in the proposed depreciation regulations issued in November 1955 and 
were carried on into the final regulations. 
The phrase "useful life" had never been used in the 1939 Code or 
prior revenue acts. It first appeared in Section 167 (c) of the 1954 Code 
which limits the use of the accelerated methods to property "with a 
useful life of three years or more." For many years prior to the enact-
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ment of the 1954 Code, the Government had consistently taken the 
position that useful life meant economic or physical life. After the 
enactment of the 1954 Code, however, the Government found it pref-
erable to contend that "useful life" meant life in the taxpayer's busi-
ness because it could then prevent the use of the accelerated methods 
on assets that are turned over within three years. 
While this concept of useful life would prevent the use of the 
accelerated methods by many taxpayers, the Government had to be 
careful that its arguments wouldn't backfire. The shortening of the 
useful life standing alone obviously increases the depreciation rate. 
Therefore, if the depreciation deduction was to be minimized the de-
preciable base had to be reduced by increasing the salvage value. The 
regulations had always viewed the depreciable base as original cost 
minus salvage value. Prior to the 1954 Code, salvage value was usually 
taken to mean the scrap or the junk value left in the asset when its 
usefulness was gone. However, since the Commissioner was now 
taking the position that useful life of an asset is the taxpayer's holding 
period, he found it necessary to define salvage value as the amount 
that wil l be realizable on sale or other disposition of an asset when it is 
no longer useful in the taxpayer's business. 
SUPREME COURT—MASSEY MOTORS, INC., ET AL. 
This radical change of definitions by the Treasury Department 
was bound to arouse the ire of some red-blooded American taxpayers. 
Massey Motors, Inc., Robley and Julia Evans, and The Hertz Cor-
poration, fought the good fight to the finish. However, the Supreme 
Court ruled against them in June 1960 and business must now accept 
and live with these rules: 
(1) "Useful life" means the period over which the asset may 
reasonably be expected to be useful to the taxpayer in his 
trade or business, and not the period of the physical or eco-
nomic life of the asset. 
(2) "Salvage value" is saleable value and must be related to the 
useful life of the asset in the taxpayer's business. 
(3) While double-declining balance depreciation is computed 
without reference to salvage value, no further depreciation 
deductions are allowed after such deductions have reduced 
the basis of the property to its salvage value. 
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The taxpayers had this much solace. They at least learned that 
they weren't entirely dreaming when they had the feeling that the 
Commissioner had changed the rules on them. Four justices dissent-
ing in the Massey and Evans cases stated that the "Commissioner's 
pre-1956 position on useful life was flatly opposed to that which he 
now takes." They said, "This is one of those situations where what 
may be thought to be an appealing practical position on the part of 
the Government, has obscured the weakness of its legal position." 
However, the battle is over and we must live with and abide by the 
new rules. What wil l be the effect of these rules on depreciation 
practices? 
E F F E C T S O F S U P R E M E C O U R T D E C I S I O N S 
(1) Generally, a business wil l be denied the use of accelerated 
depreciation on a newly purchased asset if the asset is of 
a type that the company in the past usually sold or traded 
in less than three years. However, if the company can estab-
lish that it intends to break with this past practice, the 
Treasury Department should permit the accelerated method. 
(2) Even though an asset wil l definitely have a physical life 
exceeding six years, the taxpayer must decide that he intends 
to keep it over six years before he is entitled to elect the 
first-year additional 20% depreciation. 
(3) A taxpayer must stop claiming depreciation under the declin-
ing-balance method when the basis of the property is reduced 
to its salvage value. The statement of this proposition stand-
ing alone could be misleading. We should be quick to add 
that salvage value, as defined in the regulations, "is the 
amount (determined at the time of acquisition) which is esti-
mated will be realizable upon sale or other disposition of an 
asset when it is no longer useful in the taxpayer's . . . busi-
ness." Thus, when it is said that depreciation deductions must 
stop when the basis of the property is reduced to its salvage 
value, we are speaking of the value at the time the asset is 
no longer useful in the taxpayer's business. Consequently, 
it is quite possible that under the declining-balance method, 
the depreciated cost of an asset may be less than its market 
value at a date prior to the end of the taxpayer's holding 
period. The depreciation deduction in that year would not 
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be limited so long as the basis of the asset, after deducting 
the current year's depreciation, wil l not be less than the 
amount which will be realizable when it is no longer useful 
in the taxpayer's business. 
So much for the situation when depreciated cost is less than 
market at a date prior to the end of the taxpayer's holding period. 
But what about the situation where a taxpayer disposes of an asset 
at an earlier date than the one anticipated when he acquired the 
asset? For example, let's assume that a taxpayer purchased an 
asset on January 1, 1956 for $10,000. At that time, he intended to 
keep the asset for ten years and estimated the salvage value at the 
end of ten years to be $2,000. He elected to use double-declining 
balance depreciation. In the five-year period from January 1, 1956 
to December 31, 1960 he claims $6,723 depreciation. The depreciated 
value at December 31, 1960 is then $3,277. The depreciation deduc-
tion for 1960 is $819. Now let's assume that he sells this asset on 
December 31, 1960 for $6,000. Let's further assume the Revenue 
Agent appears on the scene in February 1961 to examine all open 
years and reviews the depreciation claimed on this asset. 
The Agent might contend first that the taxpayer was not allowed 
to depreciate the asset below $6,000. Since $3,600 was claimed in the 
years 1956 and 1957, this would mean that only $400 depreciation 
would be allowable in 1958 and no deduction allowed in 1959 and 
1960. 
In order to sustain this contention it would seem that it must be 
established (1) that the asset might reasonably have been expected 
to be useful to the taxpayer for only a five-year period, and (2) at the 
time of acquisition, it was reasonable to assume that $6,000 would be 
realized on the sale of the asset after the five-year holding period. 
However, under our set of facts, you will recall that our taxpayer 
at the time he bought this asset intended to keep it for ten years. 
If he can show that it has been his practice to hold this type of asset 
for ten years he probably won't have much trouble in having the 
ten-year life accepted. On the other hand, if he hadn't purchased 
this type of asset before, he may have some difficulty in getting the 
Treasury Department to believe that it was his intention to hold it 
for ten years in view of the fact that he sold the asset after five years. 
He will then be faced with the necessity of showing what particular 
circumstance or set of circumstances caused him to change his mind. 
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Let's assume that the taxpayer satisfies the Agent that at the 
time he acquired this asset he honestly intended to hold it for ten 
years. The Agent's second contention might then be that no deprecia-
tion should be allowed for the calendar year 1960. This contention 
would be based on the following provisions of the regulations: 
R E G . 1.167 (a)-1(b) ". . . The estimated useful life may be subject 
to modification by reason of conditions known to exist at the end of 
the taxable year and shall be redetermined when necessary regardless 
of the method of computing depreciation. However, estimated remain-
ing useful life shall be redetermined only when the change in the 
useful life is significant and there is a clear and convincing basis for 
the determination." 
R E G . 1.167(a)-1(c) ". . . Salvage value shall not be changed at 
any time after the determination made at the time of acquisition merely 
because of changes in price levels. However, if there is a redetermina-
tion of useful life under the rules of paragraph (b) of this section, 
salvage value may be redetermined based upon facts known at the 
time of such redetermination of useful life." 
The Agent states that the change in the life of the asset in the 
taxpayer's hands from the originally estimated ten years to the actual 
holding period of five years was significant; and what clearer and 
more convincing basis for redetermining the useful life can there be 
than the fact that the taxpayer disposed of the asset after five years. 
Since there can be a redetermination of useful life, the regulations 
state that salvage value may be redetermined based on facts known 
at the time of such redetermination. The fact is that the taxpayer 
sold the asset for $6,000. Since the asset was already depreciated 
down to $4,096 at January 1, 1960 and the redetermined salvage value 
is $6,000, he concludes that under the Treasury rules no depreciation 
is allowable for 1960. 
There may be difficulties in overcoming this line of reasoning. 
Some encouragement can be obtained from a statement by Justice 
Harlan in his dissent in the Massey Motors case. He said, "In examin-
ing the cases, it must be borne in mind that even the Commissioner 
does not contend that a taxpayer who happens to dispose of some 
asset before its physical exhaustion must depreciate it on a useful 
life equal to the time it was actually held. It is only when the asset 
may reasonably be expected to be disposed of prior to the end of its 
physical life that a taxpayer must base depreciation on the shorter 
period." 
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C O H N D E C I S I O N 
In the Cohn case, decided by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit in 1958, the Court held that since the actual amounts that 
had been received on sale of the equipment exceeded the remaining 
undepreciated basis of the assets, no depreciation was allowable in 
the taxable year ending after such sale. The Court reached this result 
by holding the salvage value could be adjusted at or near the end 
of the useful life of the asset when it is shown by an actual sale of 
the asset that there is a substantial difference between what was 
estimated and what it actually is. 
There is one point of distinction between the facts in the Cohn 
case and the hypothetical situation we are considering here. In the 
Cohn case the taxpayer sold its assets near the end of the useful life 
it had originally estimated. The Court accepted this useful life used 
by the taxpayer. It did not change the useful life. This should be kept in 
mind when the Court said, "Insofar as this case is concerned the issue 
is whether salvage value can be adjusted at or near the end of the 
useful life of the asset when it is shown by an actual sale of the asset 
that there is a substantial difference between what was estimated and 
what it actually is." It is quite possible that this same Court might 
have ruled differently if it had been considering our situation in which 
our taxpayer planned to keep the asset for ten years at the time he 
bought it but by reason of some unforeseen circumstance decided to 
sell it after five years. There would be nothing wrong with the 1960 
depreciation claimed by our taxpayer if he held the asset beyond 1960. 
Why should the depreciation be different if the asset is sold at the end 
of 1960? We all know the one big reason why the Commissioner 
wants it to be different, and that is because of the benefit that the 
taxpayer gets under Section 1231. Congress certainly had some good 
reason in mind when it placed Section 1231 and its predecessor, Sec-
tion 117(j), in the Code. If the introduction of the accelerated depre-
ciation methods in 1954 permits the taxpayers to obtain more of a 
break under Section 1231 than Congress realized would be obtained, 
it seems to me that it is up to Congress to amend Section 1231 or 
Section 167 or both. As indicated earlier, however, it may be difficult 
to overcome the Agent's proposal to disallow the 1960 depreciation on 
the assets sold in 1960. But, if the Commissioner intends to follow 
this line of reasoning, taxpayers should be allowed to follow it too. 
Let's consider this situation. 
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Suppose a corporation sells a piece of improved real estate and 
two machines on December 31, 1960. Using conventional accounting 
procedures, its books show: A gain of $172,000 on the sale of real 
estate after claiming $2,000 depreciation on improvements in 1960; a 
gain of $7,500 on the sale of machine " A " , after claiming $2,500 de-
preciation in 1960; and a loss of $17,500 on the sale of machine " B " 
after claiming $2,500 depreciation in 1960. 
But now we want to adjust the books to follow the same line 
of reasoning that the Agent followed in our other hypothetical situa-
tion. We should, therefore, eliminate the $2,000 depreciation claimed 
in 1960 on the real estate improvements and reduce the gain on the 
sale of the real estate by $2,000. We should eliminate the $2,500 
depreciation claimed in 1960 on machine " A " and reduce the gain 
on its sale by $2,500. For both the real estate and machine " A " , we 
adjusted the salvage value to the selling price of the property for the 
purpose of computing depreciation in the year of sale. Since both 
the real estate and machine " A " were sold for more than their adjusted 
bases at the beginning of the year of sale, depreciation during the year 
of sale is disallowed entirely. Now, applying the same line of reason-
ing to machine " B " , we must adjust its salvage value downward. By 
adjusting the salvage value to the actual amount realized on the sale 
and by adjusting the useful life to terminate in the year of sale, we 
find that we must increase the 1960 depreciation on machine " B " by 
$17,500. This, of course, wipes out the $17,500 loss that had been pre-
viously recorded. The net effect of these adjustments is to increase the 
depreciation deduction by $13,000 and increase the Section 1231 gain 
by $13,000. In the case of a corporation with taxable income in excess 
of $25,000, this would reduce the tax by $3,510 (27% of $13,000). 
P O R T L A N D G E N E R A L E L E C T R I C C O M P A N Y C A S E 
The new rules on useful life established by the Commissioner and 
upheld by the Supreme Court will not always work to the advantage 
of the Commissioner. The case of Portland General Electric Company, 
decided by a district court in Oregon on September 26, 1960, is 
an interesting one if for no other reason than the fact that it was 
decided for the taxpayer, and the Commissioner was required to 
refund over one and one-half million dollars tax that he had pre-
viously collected from the taxpayer by adjusting his depreciation. But, 
its main element of interest, I believe, lies in the fact that the Court 
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cites the Massey case in support of its decision to accept the taxpayer's 
depreciation methods. The facts were somewhat involved and I won't 
attempt to discuss all the elements of the case. The interesting aspect 
relevant to our discussion at this point is this: The original deficiency 
was based on the findings of an engineering agent. At the trial this 
agent admitted that he used "assigned lives," his "experience else-
where" and "what I have known elsewhere." In days gone by, the 
testimony of an expert witness such as an engineering agent as to his 
experience elsewhere would have carried great weight in the deter-
mination of the useful life of depreciable assets. But today the rule 
as written by the Treasury Department and approved by the Supreme 
Court in Massey et al., is that the useful life of depreciable property is 
to be measured by the experience of the business in which it is used. 
The Court said, "The Commissioner overlooks the actual experience 
had by Portland General Electric and substituted information sub-
stantially gained from extrinsic experience and evidence." 
OTHER D E V E L O P M E N T S 
I have devoted a good portion of my allotted time to a discussion 
of the new concepts of useful life and salvage value. This I believe is 
the real significant current development in the area of depreciation. 
Although the controversy concerning these definitions has now been 
resolved, it seems to me that more problems have been created than 
were solved. I attempted to indicate a few of the problems. Time 
will not permit a discussion of others; and I am sure that additional 
problems, which we do not even recognize at this time, will arise in 
the future. One of the main difficulties will stem from the fact that 
the Treasury Department must evaluate the subjective position of 
each taxpayer with respect to the property he owns before it can 
formulate an opinion about whether the taxpayer's depreciation is 
computed correctly. 
Let's now turn to several other developments of the past year 
with respect to depreciation. 
" N E W I N U S E " T E S T — R U L I N G 
In February 1960 the Internal Revenue Service issued a ruling 
which held that "if a taxpayer as the original purchaser and user 
acquires and occupies a personal residence after December 31, 1953, 
and subsequently converts it to rental property, then the rental prop-
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erty meets the 'new in use' test and the taxpayer may use an ac-
celerated depreciation method." 
This, of course, isn't a development of any earth-shaking signifi-
cance since there aren't a great number of taxpayers converting their 
residences to rental property. But I do believe it is an interesting 
ruling and it focuses our attention on the requirements of Section 
167 (c) which states that the accelerated depreciation methods shall 
apply only in the case of property acquired after 1953 "if the original 
use of such property commences with the taxpayer and commences 
after such date." 
Even though the taxpayer concerned in this ruling had first used 
the property as a residence he was allowed the benefit of accelerated 
depreciation when he changed his use of the property by converting 
it to rental property. The Service held that since the property was 
not previously used by another party and since this is the first taxable 
year in which the property may be subject to depreciation allowances 
by the taxpayer, the "new in use" test is met. 
This brings to mind the reverse situation—a situation where con-
trary to one's first impression the "new in use" test is probably not 
met. Suppose a taxpayer has new equipment installed under a lease 
arrangement and several months later decides to buy the equipment. 
The taxpayer started the physical use of the equipment and it was 
new when he received it. One might conclude that accelerated depre-
ciation would therefore be available. However, bear in mind that the 
first business use of the leased equipment was for the production of 
rental income by the lessor. Accordingly, when the lessee purchases 
the property he is the second instead of the first user and it seems 
that he would not be permitted to use accelerated depreciation. 
E F F E C T O F C A R R Y O V E R P R O V I S I O N S 
There are certain exceptions to the requirement that the tax-
payer must be the original user of the property. Where ownership 
changes hands in certain tax-free transactions, Section 381 (c) (6) 
permits the transferee corporation to step into the transferor cor-
poration's shoes and continue the accelerated methods where they 
have been applied by the transferor. However, we should be careful 
to note that Section 381 (c) (6) applies only to the transactions speci-
fied in Section 381 (a). Thus, carryovers are not specifically provided 
for in the following cases where the assets received do not retain the 
263 
same basis they had in the hands of the corporation making the 
distribution: 
(1) A partial liquidation under Section 346. 
(2) A liquidation of a subsidiary corporation where the amount 
paid for its stock becomes the basis of the assets in the 
hands of the parent corporation by reason of Section 334 
(b) (2)—the so-called Kimble-Diamond rule. 
There are also situations where the basis of the assets transferred 
carries over to the transferee corporation, but Section 381 does not 
call for the carryover of the method of computing depreciation. For 
example, Section 381 does not provide for carryovers in the case of 
split-ups, split-offs, and spin-offs, that is, divisive reorganizations to 
which Section 368 (a)(1)(D), and 355 or 356 of the Code apply. 
Likewise, Section 381 does not apply to transfers of property owned 
by individuals or partnerships in tax-free incorporations under Sec-
tion 351. 
R E G U L A T I O N S U N D E R S E C T I O N 179 
The Treasury Department published the final regulations with 
respect to the additional first-year depreciation allowances on Decem-
ber 2, 1960. These regulations prescribe the type of statement that 
must be filed with the return in order properly to elect the additional 
allowance. The statement is essentially the same as that prescribed 
in the temporary rules published by the Treasury Department in 
November 1958. However, the regulations place added emphasis on 
the necessity for filing this statement. They say, "Except as pro-
vided in paragraph (d) (1) of this section, an election will not be valid 
unless the statement is submitted at the time and in the manner 
prescribed herein." Paragraph (d)(1) then provides that if the tax-
payer has claimed the additional allowance but failed to attach the 
required statement to his return, he may cure this deficiency by filing 
the required statement within 90 days after the final regulations are 
published in the Federal Register. 
The regulations also state that the taxpayer will be allowed to 
revoke his election or to change his previous selection of property 
subject to the additional allowance within 90 days after the proposals 
are final. In order to do this he must submit a statement showing 
the new selection of property or that the election is being revoked; 
and amended returns must be filed. 
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As you know, the Code permits the additional allowance only 
on Section 179 property. One of the essential elements of Section 179 
property is the requirement that it be tangible personal property. As 
we in Ohio know, the question of what is and what is not personal 
property is not a simple one. Elaborate structures firmly affixed to 
the ground or attached to a building, which in other states would be 
considered as real estate, are often taxed in Ohio as personal property. 
Apparently, the Treasury Department will not concern itself with 
our local quarrels or the determinations that have been made by our 
local tax assessors. It wil l use its own rules. The regulations state 
that "Local law definitions will not be controlling for purposes of de-
termining the term tangible personal property." Included in the 
examples given in the regulations of items not considered personal 
property are: wiring in a building, plumbing systems, pipes, ducts, or 
other items that are structural components of a building or other 
structure. 
If any of the foregoing items serves a purpose peculiar to the 
nature of the business conducted on the premises, it is probable that 
the Ohio Department of Taxation will assess it as personal property. 
However, unless the taxpayer likes to argue with the Treasury De-
partment, he will be well advised to select an item not in this category 
when electing the first-year additional depreciation allowance. 
S U R V E Y O F D E P R E C I A T I O N P R A C T I C E S 
Last summer the Treasury Department undertook a survey of 
depreciation methods and practices and of average useful lives of 
property. It sent a comprehensive questionnaire to about 3,000 large 
corporations, which claim approximately two-thirds of all corporate 
depreciation deductions. The Small Business Administration sent the 
same questionnaire to about 8,500 small businesses, that is, firms 
employing between 50 and and 250 people. 
The questionnaire elicited opinions on whether the companies 
were satisfied with current depreciation allowances; and if not, why? 
If they weren't satisfied, they were asked which of various changes 
they would like to see made, such as: 
A n up-to-date Treasury Bulletin " F " as a depreciation guide. 
Incorporation of rate schedules in the law, with the provision 
that the taxpayer could take up to a specified per cent more 
than the listed rates. 
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Allowing faster early depreciation, such as a 300% declining-
balance method. 
Extension of the 20% first-year depreciation to more assets. 
Letting depreciation deductions reflect increases in replacement 
price levels. 
The companies were also asked if in order to obtain any one or more 
of these changes they would be willing (1) to use the same method for 
both tax and accounting purposes, and (2) to pay ordinary income tax 
rather than capital gain tax on any profits from selling depreciated 
property. 
In addition to completing the questionnaire, the 3,000 larger cor-
porations were asked to prepare certain schedules. These schedules 
asked for details on the amounts invested in depreciable property, 
methods of depreciation, and so forth. 
This research project was the result of mounting pressure from 
various groups of taxpayers, many of whom have had representatives 
appearing before congressional committees urging a wide variety of 
depreciation reform measures. The Treasury Department felt that it 
couldn't evaluate the various proposals without more statistical infor-
mation on current depreciation practice. 
A t the time this project was undertaken, the Chairman of the 
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation announced his Com-
mittee's interest in this survey. He said that if the firms polled "would 
give full and prompt participation in the survey, it would greatly add 
to its reliability and usefulness in providing a sound basis for making 
revisions in the depreciation laws." The fruits of this survey should be 
available for congressional study early in 1961. It therefore appears 
that we may have grounds for hoping that serious attention will soon 
be given to some liberalization of depreciation allowances. 
D E P R E C I A T I O N P O L I C Y 
In a recent address, Mr. David A . Lindsay, General Counsel of 
the Treasury Department, indicated that the Treasury Department 
believes that any liberalization of depreciation allowances should carry 
with it an additional change in the law to the effect that income from 
the sale of depreciable property should be treated as ordinary income 
to the extent of depreciation deductions taken on the property. Such 
a change, he stated, "would discourage attempts to claim excessive 
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depreciation in order to create capital gains on disposal of overde-
preciated property." On the other hand it could "make it possible for 
revenue agents to accept more readily business judgments as to the 
useful life and salvage value of depreciable property." 
We must admit that if excessive depreciation has been claimed on 
an asset, permitting the taxpayer to pay only a capital gains tax on the 
entire income from its sale might constitute a windfall to him. How-
ever, it should be recognized that the mere fact that a piece of equip-
ment has been sold at a profit does not necessarily indicate that it has 
been overdepreciated. Except in a few unusual situations, it has been 
my experience that the gain on the sale stems from the fact, not that 
excessive depreciation has been claimed, but that the market value has 
increased—that there has been an increase in the reconstruction price— 
new—in other words, from inflation. Is it fair or equitable to extract 
a full tax on such a gain, or any tax, for that matter, particularly when 
the company has to turn around and pay double or triple the original 
price of the equipment disposed of for the replacement equipment? 
The whole depreciation problem is not so simple that the key to its 
solution lies in eliminating Section 1231 from the law. 
The Federal tax depreciation policy that is adopted will play a 
tremendously important part in the expansion or stagnation of our 
economy. The Senate Select Committee on Small Business made a 
study of the problem and concluded that "present depreciation policies 
do not sufficiently encourage the expansion of the national economy. 
Indeed, those policies have, in all probability, stifled economic 
growth." The Committee then recommended congressional review of 
all practical proposals for (1) shortening the period for depreciating 
property, (2) permitting greater depreciation in the years immediately 
after purchase of property, and (3) depreciating property on a basis 
other than historic cost. Items (1) and (2), in my opinion, are merely 
temporary measures and in no way cope with the long-term problem, 
without item (3). 
In advocating the allowance of depreciation on the basis of re-
placement value rather than through an extension of the accelerated 
depreciation theory, Mr. Logan T. Johnston, President of Armco Steel 
Corporation, presented a very strong case at the annual meeting of the 
Ohio Society of CPAs last October. He said: "Depreciation allow-
ances have a direct and profound effect on our ability to compete 
abroad. We are faced with foreign manufacturers who not only have 
lower tax and wage rates, but who are also able to build their plants at 
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lower cost and then write them off much faster than we can." He 
pointed out that "in major industry, at least, most foreign plants are 
already quite as modern as American plants and in many cases they 
are superior." "One of the main difficulties," he said, "is that our de-
preciation allowances do not compensate for inflation. Recent estimates 
indicate that cost of replacement is outrunning depreciation allowances 
in American industry by six to eight billion dollars a year." He quoted 
Professor William Paton of Michigan in estimating that "the total cost 
of capital replacement since World War II not covered by depreciation 
is between forty and fifty billion dollars." He predicted that American 
business will "be confronted with demands for more funds than can 
be generated by the business or reasonably secured in other ways." 
This means that it simply cannot afford to modernize fast enough to 
keep pace with foreign competition and at the same time maintain a 
fair rate of return to the owners of the business. It is therefore of ut-
most importance that the handicaps retarding our participation in 
world markets be dealt with intelligently. 
We as accountants and as tax practitioners should devote serious 
study to this problem. By developing workable solutions, we can make 
a noteworthy contribution to the welfare of our country, and in so 
doing can add immeasurably to the stature of our profession. 
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